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1.

At the heart of the arbitral process are its procedures.
often, and rightly, said

lt is

that it is the procedurZ�l conduct of

international arbitral proceedings, as much as any other factor, that
leads parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes.

In particular, parties agree to arbitrate their international
disputes with the objective of obtaining fair and neutral procedures
which are flexible, efficient, and capable of being tailored to the
needs

of

their

particular

dispute,

without

reference

to

the

formalities and technicalities of procedural rules applicable in
national courts.1 These objectives are principally pursued tlu·ough

. Mr. Born is the author of lNTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2008)
and INTERNATIONAL ClV!L LiTIGATION IN UNITF.O STATES COURTS (4th ed. 2006). This
Article is based on discussions of similar issues in GARY l30RN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2009). Unless otherwise noted all translations
are by the author. The author gratefully acknowledges tbe assistance of Leila
Abolfazli and Jason Fisher.
t See 1 GARY BORI\:, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 64-90 (2d ed.
2009) (discussing parties' objectives upon entering international arbitration
agreements). Not all international arbitrations are necessarily designed to achieve
every one of these objectives. For example, arbih·ations may be conducted in one
party's home jurisdiction, pursuant to the domestic procedural rules of that
jurisdictjon. Nonetheless, in n.1ost instances, parties enter into international
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the substantial autonomy that parties enjoy, under intern.ational
arbitration conventions and developed national arbitration
legislation, to agree upon arbitral procedures, and the broad
d iscretion that arbitrators are granted by the same sources to
prescribe arbitral procedures (absent contrary agreen1ent by the
parties).2 The parties' procedural autonomy and the arbitrators'
procedural discretion figure centrally in most discussions of the
arbitral process.
ln addition to addressing the content of the procedures that are
used in international arbitrations, leading international arbitration
conventions and national arbitration legislation also adopt a basic
principle of judicial non-interference in the ongoing conduct of the
arbitral proceedings. This principle of judicial non-interference in
arbitral
proceedings
is
often
overlooked.
international
Nonetheless, the principle is fundamentally important to the
efficacy of the international arbitral process, ensuring that an
arbitration can proceed, pursuant to the agreement of the parties or
under the direction of the tribunal, without the delays, second
guessing, and other problems associated with interlocutory judicial
review of procedural decisions. This Article addresses both the
background of the principle of judicial non-interference and its
legal bases in the New York Convention (and other international
arbitration conventions) and in national arbitration legislation.

commercial arbitration agreements with the objective of achieving all or most of
these ends.
2 Similar objectives exist in the context of state-to-state arbitrations. See Int'l
L. Comm'n., Memorandum on Arbitral Procedure, [1950] 2 Y.B. lnt'l Comm'n 157,
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/35/1950 (reviewing the procedures used in contemporary
state-to-state arbitrations and their objectives); Inst Int'l L., Projet de Reglement
pour Ia Procedure Arbitrale Internationale [Project for the Creation of International
Arbitration Procedures], art. 15 (A ug. 28, 1875), available at http://www.idi
-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1875_haye_Ol_fr.pdf; see also Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes arts. 37-90, Jul. 29, 1899, 2 U.S.T. 2016
(outlining arbitral procedure that governs signatories, unless other rules are
agreed upon by the parties); James Crawford, Advocacy Before the International
.

Court of Justice and Other International Tribunals in State-to-State Cases, in THE ART OF

11, 13 (R. Doak Bishop ed., 2004)
(describing historic use of a "combination of full written and oral phases" of
arbitration).
ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
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0 BJECT1V£S OF ARBlTRAL PROCEDURES lN lNTERNA TlONAL
ARBITRA TION

One

of

the

fundan1ental

objectives

of

most

international

commercial cnbitrations is procedural neutrality.?>

International

disputes almost inevitably involve parties from different home
jurif'dictions (i.e., a Kuwaiti company, with procedural experience
and expectations rooted in Islam.ic law and culture, con tractj n g
with

a

French

company,

whose

procedural

experience

and

expectations wm be based upon contemporary European civil law
procedures).

Naturally, some parties wilJ be more

'l

international''

than others, and have greater or lesser expectations that the
procedures of their own home Jurisdiction will necessarily apply in
future

But

disputes.

one

of

the

fundamental

objective

of

international arbitration is to ensure th a t ( u nless the parties agree
otherwise) disputes will not be resolved in Clccordance with the
procedures of one party's-and not tbe other party's-home
jurisdiction, which may favor, explicitly or implicitly, one party
over the other.

The objective of procedm:al neutrality is an

expression of the basic equality o f the pcuties, lying at the heart of
their efforts to achieve a neutral, objective tneans of international
dispute

resolution

and

guaranteed

by

leading

international

arbitration conventions and national arbitration legislatjon.4

A

closely

related

objective

arbitration is pxocedural fairness.

of

intexnational

commercial

Parties agree to international

arbitration, anwng other things, in order to obtain fair and
objective procedures guaranteeing both parties an equal
opportunity to be heard.

This objective is inherent i n the

adjudicative character of international arbitration, in which the
arbitrators are obligated to decide the parties' dispute impartially
and objectively, based upon the law and the evidence presented by

3 See, e.g., Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
801, 2007 SCC 34, � 51 (Can.) ("The neutrality of arbitration . . . is one of the
fundamental characteristics of this alternative dispute resolution mechanism. . . .
[A]rbitration is an institution without a forum and without a geographic basis.").
•l See Convention on the R ecognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. V( l)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U. S . T. 2518, 330 U.N. T. S . 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention] (permitting the refusal to recognize and enforce an
arbitral e1ward wherE! the parties ore not on equal footing because the party
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
proceedi.ngs or was otherwise unable to present a case); MODEL LAW ON lNT'L
COMMERCIAL A RBITRATION art. 18 (1985) [hereinafter UNClTRA L, MODEL LAW]
("The parties shall be treated with equality . . . . " ) .
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the parties.s
international

This objective is implem e nted by the terms o f both
arbjtration

conventions

and

nabonal

arbitration

legislation, both of which guar<lntee the parties' procedural rights.6
Beyond neutrality and fairness, parties agree to international
arbitr<�tion with

the objective of obtaining dispute resolution

procedures that strea mline the nrbitral proceedi ngs and allow a

s peedy ,

dficient, and ex pe rt result.' This objective is facilitated by

a wards

and other decisions by the mbitrators -a legal regime

the n1inimal scope that is permitted for ju d icia l review of arbitr a l

under which the pmties exc ha n ge the safeguards of appellate
review for the bene.fits of speed, economy, and finality.

This

retlects businessmen and businesswomen's desires for ce r tainty of

resu Its and efficiency of procedures, as well

ClS

s ke p ticism about

the possibiliti� o£ ac hi ev i n g "correct'' or "perfecto results thr ough

multiple layers of appellate rev i ew in nalional courts.

[nternational arbitration is a l so designed with the objective of

avojding the formalities and techruce1lities that are associated with
many national

litigation

systems.

Arbitration

is

chosen

by

in ternational businessmen and businessvvomen in order to provide

unerc ially

con

sensible and praclical resolutions to cross-border

conlnlercial disputes. This perm i ts-ind ee d, requires-dispensing

a re des i gn ed for

w i t h ntany of the procedural pro tecti ons

tha t

don1estic litigation irwolving individual

litigants, a n d instead

adopting procedures that w il l achieve com.. mercially practic able
results.
ot

A close1y related obj ective of j n ternational arbitration is the use
a.rbih·al procedures that are flexible and tailored to t he pa rti es
'

5 See 2 BORN, supra note 1, at 1742-44 ("One of the fundamental objectives of
most international commercial arbitrations is procedural neutrality.").
r, fd.; New York Convention, s11prn note 4, art. V(l)(b) (allowing the non
enforcement of an award where one party was 1.mable to present a case);
UNClTRAL, MODEL LAW art. 18 (stating that "each party shall be given a full
opportunity of presenting his case").
7 See 1 BORN, supm note 1 , at 66 (noting that parties usually agree on
arbitration because i t provides efficiency in resolving a future dispute); Ballentine
Books, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962) ( " A fortiori an
arbitrator should act affirmatively to simplify and expedite the proceedings before
him, since among the virtues of arbitration which presumably have moved the
parties to agree upon it are speed and informality."); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §
33 (Eng.) (imposing duty on the trib1.. mal to ''adopt procedures suitable to the
circumstances of the particular case, avoidit)g unnecessary delay or expense, so as
to provide a f<tir means for the resolution of the matters failing to be
lletermined'1).
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particular dispute and mutual desires.s This is well described in
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(''UNCITRAL") Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceeding:
This [procedural flexibj]ity] is useful in that i t enables the
arbitral tTibunal to Lake decisions on the organization of
proceedings that take into account the circumstances of the
case, the expectations of the pcu-ties and of tlle members of
the arbitral tribLmat and the need for a just and cost
efficient resolution of lhe dlsputeY
Indeed, this procedural freedom Clnd flexibil i ty is one of the
essential foundations of lhe arbitral process:
[U]nlike the position in court, ·vvhen both the parties and the
tribunal are governed by fixed proced u ral rules which will
be generally adversarial in character, in arbitrations the
mutual functions of the parties' lawyers and the tribunal
tend to be complementary and co-operational, at least on
the surface. Although often coming from different cultures
aJ.'ld legal philosophies, they must work, and to son1e extent
live, together b-orn the beginning to the end of each case,
with i n termittent hearings in hotels or other locations
which may cover periods. of weeks, interspersed with
periods of correspondence. During this process they n1ust
largely fashion their own procedure. They 111ust perforce
get to know and show respect for each other, and make
s See 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 414 (noting that parties get to select their
procedural law by agreement); Emmanuel Gaillard & Philippe Pinsolle, Advocacy

in International Commercial Arbitratio11: France, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN
lNTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra
note 2, al 133, 133 (' 'International

arbitration . .. gives the parties and their counsels the widest possible range of
options."); GEORGIOS PETROCHfLOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
A RBIT RATION para. 3.73 (2004) ("[M]odern law affords arbitrating parties and
arbitral tribtmals wide freedom to fashion the procedural rules of the
proceedings. ''); Robert Pietrowski, Evidence i11 International ArbitrntiO!'l, 22 ARB.
TNT'L 373, 374 (2006) ("[T]he procedure of most international tribunals is
characterized by an absence of restrictive rules governing the form, submission
and admissibility of evidence.").
9 U.N. Comm'n on Tnt'l Trade Law [UNOTRAL], UNClTRAL Notes on
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings � 4, available nt http) /www uncitral.orgluncitral
1 en/uncitral_textslarbitrationll996Notes_proceedings.hbnl; see also UNCITRJ\ L,
Report of the UNCJTRAL on tl1e Work of its Twe1'1ty-Ni11flt Session, �[ 15, U.N. Doc.
Al51l17 (Aug. 14, 1996), availnbl!! at http:lldaccessdds:.un.org/dociUNDOC
IGENIN96I206j41IPDFIN962064l.pd(?OpenE1ernent.
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allowances for different p oints of view, with b oth the
lawyers and the h·ibuna l con stantly try i n g to ensu re as
much harmony as circ u mstances may permit. 1D
The tailoring of procedures to a particular case m a y i nvolve
esta b lishing

an

exped ited

" fast-track"

emphasizin g p articular types

arbitral

of ev i d ence

procedure,

(e.g., technical,

or
s ite

inspection), or employing im1ovahve evi dence-taking procedures
(e. g., w itness-conferencing, meetings of experts) .

Alternatively, it

may involve using relativel y conventional litigation procedures,
much l ike those in some nati onal courts, to hear the p arties'
submissions and evidence.

In a l l cases, however, the p arties'

autonomy and the tribunal's discretion are intended to be used to
adopt procedures designed to permit the most effic ient, rel i a ble,
and sensible presentation of the parties' evidence and arguments in
a p articular c ase.
3.

P ARTIES' P ROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL
A RBITRATION

One of the most fund a mental characteristics of i nternati o n a l
commerci a l arbitrati o n is the p arties' freedom to a gree upon the
arbitral procedure.
York

Conventio n

This principle is acknowledged i n the New
and

other

major

i nternational

arbitration

conventions. The princi p l e i s guaranteed by arbitratio n statutes in
v irtual l y all developed jurisd ictions and it i s contained i n and
facilitated b y the rules of most l eading arbitral institutions.

The

principle of the p arties' procedural autonomy is qua lified o nly b y
the mandatory requirements of a pplicable national l a w and, under
most developed arbitration statutes, even these requirements are
ordinarily l imited in scope.
3.1. Parties' Procedural Autonomy under International Arbitration

Corzventions
Leading

international

arbitration

conventions

uniformly

recognize and give effect to the p arties' autonomy to determine the
arbitral procedures.11 Most importantly, the New York C o nvention

10

Michael Kerr, Concord nnd Conflict in In ternational Arbitration, 13 ARB. INT'L

121, 125 (1997).
11

The Geneva Protocol required that "the arbitral procedure, including the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the parties
and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place."
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
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gives effect lo the central role of the parties' autonomy to fashion
the arbitration procedure, and provides for the non-recognition of
awards following proceedings tl.1at failed to adhere to the p a rti es
agreed procedures. Thus, Article V(l)(d) of the Convention
permits non-recognition of an arbitral award if " [t]he composition
of the arbitral au thority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreen1ent of the parties, or, failing such
agreentent, was not 1n accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place."t2 Article V(l)(d) is of vital
importance because i t recognizes, in explicit tenus, the parties'
au tonomy to agree upon the arbih·al proceduresJ including
procedures different from those prescribed by the laws of the
arbitral seat: where the parties have made such an agreen1cnt,
Article V(1)(d) requires, in effect, that their agree1nent be followed,
notwithstanding contrary procedural rules in the seat of the
arbitration. As one coaunentator correctly puts it, " Article V(I)(d)
simply makes party autonomy the sole determinant i n matters
procedurat the only limit to such autonomy at the enforcement
stage being subparagraph (b) of the same paragraph, which reflects
the principles of natural justice.''n Even more directly, and
a pplic able outside the recognition context Article II of the
Convention requires courts of Contracting States to recognize valid
arbitration agreements and refer the parties to arbih·ation pursuant
to such agreements. 1 4 This obligation extends to all n1aterial terms
of a n agreement to arbitrate-including the parties' agreement
regarding arbitral seat, number of arbitrators, institutional rules,
and arbitral procedu res.1s
Properly understood1 Article I I thus requires Contracting States
to gi ve effect to agreements regarding arbitral procedures. As
'

Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Cla uses art. 2, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 LN.T.S. 157
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. This provision was generally understood as
requiring compliance with the procedural law of the arbitral seat. See 1 BORN,
suprn note 1, at 1253-54.
n New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(1)(d).
l3 PETROCHILOS, supm note 8, para. 8.4.1; see also Gaillard & Pinsolle, supra
note 81 at 133 (discussing parties' freedom to choose the venue, arbitrators, and
applicab1e procedural rules); MAITIS KURKELA & t-'IANNES SNELLMANN, DUE
PROCESS IN lNTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 84-86 (2005) (discussing
non-respect as a violation of due process). As discussed above, this contrasts with
Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. See
sllpm note 11 and accompanying text.
ld New York Convention, ::.upra note 4, arts. Il(1), ll(3).
15 See 1 BORN, supra note 1. at 567-69.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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d iscussed a bove, thi s o bligation is su bject to a limited exception
where the

p ar ties'

procedural

agreement violates

mand atory

national public policies guaranteeing an o p portunity to be heard or
equ a l ity of treatment.

A lthou gh it is bey ond the scope of this

Essay, even i n these l i m ited cases, the Convention should be
interpreted as imposing internati onal l im its o n the extent to which
mandatory nationa l procedural requirements may overr i de the
p arties' procedural autonomy . 16
Even more directly, but to the same effect the European
Conventio n provides in Article I V (l) (b) ( iii) that parties shall be free
" to l a y down the procedure to be followed by the a rbitrators. " 17
The Inter-American Convention similarly pro v i des i n Articles
and

3

2

that the arbitration shall be conducted acco r d i n g to the

" agreement of the p arties . " 1s

These provisions affirm, in more

d irect and mandatory term s than the language of the New York
Convention, the p arties' procedural autonomy in i nternational
arbitration.
3.2. Parties' Procedural Autonomy under National Arbitration

Legislation

Arbitration

legislation

in

most

maj or

tradi n g

nations

implements the proviSIOn s of the New York Convention (and
parallel international arbitration conventions)

16

by

guaranteein g

See id. In particular, the Convention imposes structural l imits on the
application of idiosyncratic or discriminatory local public policies (such as rules
requiring that all arbitrators be local nationals, that local language be used in all
arbitral proceedings, or that all arbitral proceedings be conducted on local
territory) .
17 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 art.
IV(1) (b) (iii), Apr. 21 , 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter European Convention] .
Article IV(4) (d) also provides that, where the parties have not agreed upon the
arbitral procedure, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the arbitral rules. See 2
BORN, supra note 1 , at 1 758-60. Like Article V(1) (d) of the New York Convention,
Article IX(l) (d) of the European Convention provides for the non-recognition of
arbitral awards if the procedure followed by the tribunal departed from that
agreed upon by the parties.
18 Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention provides that the arbitrators
shall be appointed " in a manner agreed upon by the parties." Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention] . Article 3 provides
that " [i)n the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the arbitration
shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Inter
An1erican Com.mercial Arbitration Commission." Id. art. 3. 2 BORN, supra note 1 ,
at 1758-60.
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parties the freedom to agree mutually upon the procedural rules
governing the. cm1dnct o[ the ar bitrntio11 (subject only to li.mlted
mandatory restrictions of national law).19 The UNCITRAL Model
Law provides, in Article 19(1), that "[s]ubject to the provisions of
this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the n rb i t ral tribunal in conducting the proceedjngs."20
More specifically, the parties' freedom to agree upon various
matters relating to the presentation of their cases and the taking oJ
evidence is expressly recognized in Articles 18, 19(1) and 24(1) of
the Model Law. 21
Similarly, A r b d e '182(1) of the Swiss Law on Private
lnternational Law provides that "[t]he parties may, directly or by
reference to rules of arbitration, detennine tbe arbitral procedure;
t h ey m.ay also submit the arbitral procedure to a procedural law of
their choice."22
Other arbitration legislation in developed
jurisdictions is sin1ilar, including in England,23 France,24
19

See

2 BORN, supra

note 1, at 1751-53; Thomas I I. Webstet,

Party Control in

19 ARB. l NT L 119, 1 1 9 (2003) ("Parties determine the
applicable law and arbitri::l tion rules . . . . ");Pierre Lalive, On file Ncrtfmli�t vf the
Inlemnlionnl 1\rbitmtioll,

'

Arbitmlor and of flw PlnCt' lif Arbilratiull, in SWISS ESSAYS ON fNT£RNATlONAL

ARBITRATION 23, 29 (1984) (" [M]odern lc1w of international arbitration today leaves
a wide autonomy to th� parties with regard to procedme (subject onJy to

universally recognized fundamental guarantees of fairness and equality),").
20 UNCJTRAL, MODEL LAW, supm note 4, art. 19(1). The drafting history of
the Model Law confirms the parties' procedural autonomy in emphatic terms,
''probably tire most impo rtant principle on which the model law should be based is
the freedom of the parties in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the
international commercial arbitrations according to their expectations." Report of
the Secretary-General on Possible FeatII res of 11 Model Law on 111temational Commercial

12 Y.B. on lnt'l Trad� L. 78, ,j17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207 (1 981)
(emphasis added).
21 See UNCTTRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, arts. 18, 19(1), 24(1),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1 976) ("Each party shall have the burden of
proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defence.").
22 Loi Federate sur Je Droit International Prive [RS] [FederaJ Statute on
Private ]nternational Law] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 182(1) (Switz.), reprillted in
Swiss Chambers' Court of Arbitration and Mediation (Marc Blessing et al. h·ans.),
https://www.sccam.org/sajdownloadjTPRG_english.pdf. For commentary on
Article 182, see Michael E. Schneider, Article 182, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN SWTTZERLAND: AN INTRODUCTION TO AND A COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES 176-194 OF
THE SWISS PRIVATE ll\lTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE 395 (Stephen V. Berti ed., 2000).
23 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § l(b) (Eng.) (''[T]he parties should be free
agree
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are
to
necessary in the public interest."); id, § 33 (outlining the general duties of the
tribunal in arbitral proceedings); irt. § 34 (describi ng the treatment of procedural
and evidentiary matters before an <lrbilral tribunal). See also ROBERT MERKIN,

Arbitration,
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Germany/:; Belgium,:!" Austrid,27 japan,:!s Sing2lpore,2\J and
clsewhere)O In the United States, the statutory text of the Federal
AR�rrRATIO:-J ACT1996 11�1 '14.1-1-!.3-.l (3rd cd., ::wos & rev. 2007) (noting that "[t]hc
parties are free to agree when e1rbitr,1l proceeding" c1re to be regarded a:;
commenced").
24 Sec Decree No. 81-500 of :vtny l2, l98J, Jovrnol Officil!l de la Republique
Fran<;aise U.O.j [Official Gazette of Francel, May 14, 1981, p. 1398, reprinted iu
Nouveau Code de Pmcedure Civile [f\:.C.P.C.J art. 1494, rrvailnble nf
http:/jwwvv.legifrance.gouv.fr/afCichCode.do?cid-rexlt"''LECITEXt000006070716
&dateTexte=20090412) ("The arbih·ation agret>mcnt may, directly or by way of
reference to a resnlution bv arbitration, luy do\vn the procedure to be followed in
the col!rse of the <1rbitr<�tio-n proceeding; it rnay abo bJ:ing the latter under the l<1w
applicable to procedur.:�l rrwtters th<1t it �lelermint.'s.''). Sec ni!'tl Caill<�rd & PinsoJle,
f;llpm note 8, at -134 ("French luw pla1ces no llmitatitlll upun the parties' and the
arbitrators' freedom.").
:!S
See Zivilprozel.Sordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] January 1, 1998,
Bu ndesgesetzblatt. Teil l [ BCBI. lL § 1042(J) (F.R.G.) ("Furthermore, Stl bject to the
mandatory provisions of thi� book the parties may cl1oose the procedure
themselves or by reference to institution,, I arbitral rules.''); ;;t.'L' nl�t> Peter Schlosser,
in 9 KOMMENTAR ZUI{ ZIVILPRQZESSORDNUNG [Commentary on Civil Procedure
Law] § 1042, � .3 (Fortgefi.ihrt Von Friedrich Stein & Martin jonas eds., 2.002).
2r, See Judicial Code, art. 1693(1) (Belg.) ("Without prejudice to the provisions
of Article 1694, the parties m<1y decide on the rules of the arbitral procedure...
. ).
'27 See ZivilprozesSLlrdt1ung [ZPOj [Ci\'il Procedure Statute) § 594(1) (AuslTia),
translated in Cl-!R1STOPHEI\ LlEBSCHER, T! IE AL1STWAN ARBlTRAT[QN ACT 2006: TEXl
Al'-D
T Nons (Kluwer L21w lnt'l ed. 2006) ("Subject to the mandatory provisions of
this Section, the parties are free to determ[ne on the rules of procedure. The
parties may thereby refer other rules of pro(edure."); Herbert Hausmaninger, ill 2
KOMMENTAR ZU DEN ZIVILPROZEgGESETZE § 594, �2 (1 L Fasching ed., 2007) ("This
freedom of discretion i.s of central importance for arbitral proceedings in general
and for international arbitral proceedings in particular.'').
23 Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 26, no. 1 Oapan), trn11slnterf in
Arbitration law Follow-Up Research Croup Arbitration Law, http:/ fwww.kantei
.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/ arbitrationlaw.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) ("The
parties are free to agree on the procedw·e to be followed by the �u:bitral tribunal in
conducting the arbitral proceedings. Provided, it shall nol violate the provisions
of this Law relating to public policy.").
29 International Arbitration Act, 2002, Cb. 143A, § 15A(6) (Sing.), reprinted in
lTA REPORTER (Michael Huang ed.) ("The parties may make the arrangements ..
by agreeing to the applicaUon or adoption oE rules of arbitraUon or by providing
any other means by which a matter may be decided.").
30 See, e.g., Voluntary Arbitration Act, art. 15(1), L. no. 31/863 (2003) (Port.)
(noting that parties may agree on the rules of procedure); obcansky soudni fad
c. 99/1963 Sb., art. 19 (Czech Rep.) (stating that under Article 19 parties are free to
agree on the procedure); The Arbitrati'on and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26, Acts
of Parliament, 1996 (India) (stating that under Article 19(2) parties are free to
agree on the procedure used by the arbitral trihunal); Nomos (1999:2735)
[lnte.rnational Commercial Arbitration Law], 2004, (Greece), See also European
Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitre1lion Annex art. J5(1), Jan. 20,
1966, Euro. TS. No. 56 (''Without prejudice lo the provisions of t\rticle 16, the
"

.
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Arbitration Act ( " FAA " ) is s i lent but jud icial decisions u niformly
confirm the p a rties' freedom to a gree upon the arbitral procedures
(subj ect to v ery l imited requirements of p rocedural fairness) . 31
The parties' autonomy w i th regard to procedur a l m.atters has
been affirmed in empha tic terms b y the Paris Cour d' a p p e l :
I t h a s been established that the a rbitration i n question . . . i s
a n international arbi tration governed b y the intentions o f
the parties.

I n this case, the rules of domestic l a w h a v e a

purely sub s i diary role and a p p ly only in the absence of a
s pecific a greemen t by the p a rties . . . the rules of the [ ICC]
Court of A rbitration,

which constitute the law o f the

p ar ties, must be applied to the exclusion of all other l a w s Y
A U .S. court observed, t o similar e ffect, tha t " [p ] arties may
choose to b e governed by whatever rules they wish regarding how
a n arbitration itself will be cond uc ted, " JJ while a nother remarked,
more colorfully, that between competent p arties, even p r ocedures
such as " fl i p p i n g a coin, or, for that matter, arm wrestling" are

parties may decide on the rules o f the arbitral procedure and on the place of
arbitration. If the parties do not indicate their intention before the first arbitrator
has accepted his office, the decision shall be a matter for the arbitrators." ) .
31 See, e.g., UHC Mgmt. C o . v. Computer Scis. Corp., 1 4 8 F . 3 d 992, 995 (8th
Cir. 1998) (noting that private agreements to arbitrate are usually enforced
according to their terms); Glass Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l
Union v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that if
there is a conflict between federal arbitration rules and state law, the federal law
applies); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir.
2004) (" [T]he FAA requires arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the
parties'] agreemen t.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Indeed, short of
authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three
monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the
arbitration of their disputes . . . . ) . See also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (noting the FAA was designed to ensure that arbitration
agreements that parties entered into were enforced); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT,
Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 2 (2000) (" [A]rbitration is a consensual process in which
autonomy of the parties who enter into arbitration agreements should be given
primary consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions of
fundamental fairness. This approach provides parties with the opportunity in
most instances to shape the arbitration process to their own particular needs.").
3 2 Raffinerie de petrole d'Homs et de Banias v . Chambre de commerce
internationale, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May. 1 5, 1985,
reprin ted in 1985 REV. ARB. 141 .
33 UHC Mgm t. Co., 1 48 F.3d at 997.
"
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For their part, English authorities have upheld sui

generis procedural mechanisms, such as selecting arbitra tors by
drawing narnes by lot.JS
(n contrast, i t is virtually impossible to identify contetn.porary
authority that denies or even questions the principle of the parties'
procedural a u tonomy in international commerci a 1 arbitra tions. A t
the same tin1e, however, a s discussed below, the parties) a utonorny
in

all

developed jurisdictions is subject to the limitations of

mandatory national public policies regarding procedural matters.31i
3.3. A rbitrlltors' Procedu ral Discretion in Jntcmationai A rbitmtio11

Although leading i nternational

arbi trettjon

conventions and

national law in most developed states perrnit parties to agree upon
the arbitral procedures, subject only to minimal mandatory due
process requirements) parties in practice oflen do not agree in
advance on detailed procedural rules for their arbitra tion. Instead,
arbitration

agreements

will

ordinarily

provide

simply

for

arbitration pursuant to a set of institutional rules, which supply
only a broad procedural framework.

Filling in the considerable

gaps in this framework will be Ieft to the subsequent agreement of
the parties or, if they cannot agree, the arbitral tribunal.

The

arbitrators' discretion to determine the arbitral procedure, in the
absence o£ agreement between the parties on such matters, i s
another one o f the foundations of the international arbitral process.
3.4. Arbitral Tribunal's Procedu ral Discretion u nde·r International
Arbitration Conventions

Leading irtternational arbitration

conventions

confirn1

the

arbitral tribunal's power, in the absence of agreement by the
parties, to determine the arbitral procedures.

Most explicitly,

Article IV(4)(d) of the European Convention provides that, where

34 Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
Although vivid, it is not clear that entirely arbitrary or random procedures would
be acceptable under most international and national law standards of due process
and procedural fairness. [n particular, random chance or physical endurance
would likely not provide either party with an opportunity to be heard in an
adjudicative process, as requ ired under most national and international
arbitration regimes. See 2 BORN, s11pra note 1, at 1794-1873, for a general
description of what procedures will be heard under international arbitration
regimes.
35 Iu re Shaw & Sims, [1851] 17 l.l.T.R. 160 (lr.).
,r, See ir�fm notes 411-53 and accompanying text.
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agreed upon arbitral procedures, t h e tribunal
may " establish directly or by reference to the rules and statutes of a
permanent arbitral institution t h e rules of procedure to be followed
by the arbitrator(s) . . . . ";7
The Inter-American Convention also ex p ress ly recognizes the
arbitral tribuna l ' s p roce d ura l zruthority, albeit indirectly, providing
in Article 3 th a t '' [ i ] n the absence of an exprE!ss agreement bet·ween
the t arties, the arbitration shall be con duc te d in accordance with
the rules of p r oc ed u re of the Inter-American Commercial
In turn, Article 15 of the Inter
Arbitration Commissi on.''31'
A me rican Comrnercial A rbitrillion Commission ( " f A CAC") Rules
grants the arbi trators broCld procedural authority, st1bject on l y to
basic requirements of equality and fairness.3C)
The New York Convention refers less directly to lhe arbitral
tribunill' s power to determine the a x bi h·al procedures, but
produces the sarne result.
The Convention makes no d i rect
reference to the tribunal's authority to conduct the proceedings,

the parties

have not

,

'

A

only i n d i rectly acknowledging such powers in Articles V(l)(b) and
(d).40

At the same time, Article

I1(3)

o f the Convention requires

arbitrate, an essential
.implied authorization to the

giving effect to the parties) agreement to
element of which is

either express

or

arbitrators to conduct the arbitral proceed ings as they deem best
(absent contrary agreement by the parties on specific matters).41
Even where the tribunal's procedural authority is not expressly
recognized in applicable international conventions, there can be n o
doubt a s t o the internationally-recognized status of such authority.

An i nherent characteristic o f the arbitral process i s the tribunal's
adjudicative

i m ple men t i n g

role

and

responsibility

for

establishing

and

the procedures necessary to resolve the parties1

37

European Convention, supra note 17, art. IY(4)(d).
lnter-American Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.
39 lNTER-AM. COMMERCfAL ARBITRATION COMM'N R., art. 12(a) (2002), available
at htlp:/jwww.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22093 ("Subject to these Rules, the arbitral
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as i t considers appropriate,
provided that the parties are h·eated with equality and that at any stage of the
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.").
�o New York Convention, supra note 4, arts. V(l)(b), V(l)(d) (stating that both
Article V(1)(b) and V(l)(d) of the New York Convention provide grounds for
nonrecognition of an award that presuppose the tribunal's power to determine
arbitral procedmes in the ubsence of agreement by the parties). See 2 BORN, suprn
note 1, at 2737-77.
·11 Set' $11/'1'11 notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also 2 BORN,suprn note l, at
1776-77.
38
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dispute. The tribunal's procedural authority is a n implicit part of
the parties' agreement to arbitrate�2 and is an indjspensable
precondition for an effective Clrbitral process. Accord i ngly, just as
Article [I of the New York Convention, and equiva lent provisions
of other International cn-bjtration conventions, gu21 rantee the
parties' procedural autonomy/3 these conventions also guarantee
the tribunal's authority over the arbitrc-d procedures (absent
contrary agreement). As discussed below, the tribunal's authority
is subject to restrictions, imposed by mandatory national lavvs
regard ing proced ural matters, but these limitations are i n practice
seldom applicab]e.
4.

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S PROCEDURAL DISCRETION UNDER

NAl!ONAL ARRITRATION LEGlSLATTON

Consistent with the New York Conven.tionJ most developed
national legal systems provide the arbitral tribunal with substantial
d iscretion to establish the arbitral procedures in tlle absence of
agreement between the parties, subject only to general due process
requircrnents.
Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
provides that, where the parties have not agreed upon the arbitrc:�l
procedures, the arbitral tribunal n1ay . . . conduct the arbitration
in such l'l manner as il considers appropriate."44 Article 24(1) of the
Model Law is similar, providing that, ''[s] ubject to any contrary
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether
to hold an oral hearing for the presentation of evidence or for oral
argument. . . . "45 French, Swiss, and other civil law arbitration
11

42 Most instihttional arbitration rules expressly provide the arbitral tribunal
discretion to establish the arbitral procedures (absent agreement between the
parties). See 2 BORN, supra note 1, at 1758-65 (analyzing the arbitral tribunal's
procedural discretion under international arbitration conventions). This aulhority
forms part of the parties' arbitration agreement and is entitled to recognition
under Article Tt oi the Convention.
43 See supra note 11 and accomp<mying text.
44 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW, st�pm note t
.: a1i. 19(2). As discussed below,
Article 19(2) limits the h·ibunal' s powers by reference to the " provisions of this
Law," which includes Article 18's requirements that the parties be treated "with
equality" and be given a "full opportLmity of presenting [their] case(sj." See 2
BORN, supra note 1, at 1760-62.
45 UNClTRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art. 24(1). See 2 Born, supra note 1,
at 1760-62.
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st21tutes are similar,-Hi

as

10]3

i s contemporary arbitration legislation i n

much o f Asiir1:· and La tin /\merica:1x

In the United Stales, lhe FAA docs not

provide any basic
framework that the

o r procedural
that the parties m21y deviC�te from;
leaves a l l issues of p roced urc entirely

principles of arbitral procedure
arbitrators mip;hl consider or

as

such, the Act effectively

lo

See, c.;.; 1\:der<ll Stntute on Privatt: l n ternationnl L.� nv· Dec. lS, 1%7, RS 291,
182(2) (Switz.) ("If 1hl! p;wtit.:s have not determined tll<.: procedure, the Arbitral
Tribun�1l .:;h,lll dt!lt>r111 t nc it to the extent necessan', ei iher d ircctl v or bv reference
to �, st<�lutl' ��r to ru les of .nrbitrJtion."); Decree No. R1-50U of May-1'2, 1981, journal
Offi..:: icl de l<l l�et,ublique Fram;aisc lJ.O.] [Official Gazette of France], p. 1398,
repri11tcd in N.C.f'.C. cnl!:i. -1-1-9-1-, 1460 (Fr.) ("The arbitrators slwll l<lY down the rules
for the arbitr,ltion �1roceedin)SS without being bound by lhe rules governing the
courts of !Oilw, snvl: wht?re the p<�rties have decided otherwise as stipulated in the
arbitraliOr1 agreement. " ) ; ZivilprozcGordnung [ZPOJ § 1047 (FXG.) ("Subject to
agreement by the parties, the arbi tral tribtm<ll shall decide whethe1· to hold oral
hearings nr wht·lhcr tlte proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of
documents c'lnd other materials. Unless the parties h<�ve agreed that no hearings
shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at etn etppropriate stage
of the proceeding:;;, if so requested by a party"); Zivilprozessord nung fZPO] § 594
(Austria) ("[llhe pMtiE's arc free to deterrnine the rules of procedure , . . . F,1 iling
such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal . . . conduct t1le arbitration i n the manner
that it considers appropriate."); Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering
[Netherlands Codl' of Civil Procedure], bk. 4, art. 1036 (Neth.), tmnf:lnted nt
Netherlands Arbitration Acl Code of Gvil Procedure, http:/ /www.jus.uio.no
/ lm/netherlands.<1rbitr<:ltion.act.1986/1036.hlm.l (last visited Apr. 9, 2009)
("Subjecl to the provisions of this Title, the arbitral proceedings shall be
conducted 1n such manner as agreed between the pa rties or, to the e, ten.t that the
parties have not agreed, as determined by the arbitral tribunal."); Houdende het
gerechtelijk wetboek [Belgia n Judicial Code], art. 1693(1). See nlso Oberster
Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] )an. 25, 1992, 7 Ob 545/92, 1 997 Y.B. Comm.
Arb. 619 (Austria) ("The parties rnay determine tlH� arbitral proceJure i n the
arbitmtion agreement or in a separate written agreement.
Lacking such
agreement, the arbitrators decide on the procedure.").
-�7 See, e.g.,
Arbitration Law, art. 26(2) (Japan) ("Failing such agreemen t
[between the parties], the arbitral tribunal may, subject t o the provisions o f this
Law, conduct the arbitral proceedings in such manner as it considers
appropri"ate."); Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'!
People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 39 (P.R.C.), translated nt
Arb it ration
Law
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China,
http:/ I
www.lawinfochina.com/lawjdisplay.asp?id=710 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) ("An
arbitration tribunal shall hold oral hearings to hear a case. Whereas the parties
concerned agree not to hold oral hearings, the arbitration tribunal may give the
awa:rd based on the arbitration application, claims and counter-claims and other
documents"); [nternational Arbitration P.ct, § 3(1) (Sing.); Hong Kong Arbitration
Ordinance, No. 341, art. 34C{l ) (1990), available at http:/ /www.hklii.org/hk/legis
/ord/341.
·1� See, e.g., C6digo de Comercio [Coo. CoM] (Mexican Commercial Code], art.
1435(2) (Mex.); international Commercial Arbitration Law, R. No. 1 9.9711 art. 19(2)
(2004) (Chile).
-t "
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the parties and arbitrators . .J9 A l t hough the FAA does not expressly
add ress

the

s u bj ec t,

U .S.

courts

have

u niformly

hel d

tha t

a r b i tr a tors possess broad p o wers to determine arbitral proced ures
(absent agreement on s uc h matters b y the parti es) . s o As one U . S .
c o u r t hel d :
Unless a m o d e of conducting the proceedings h a s been
prescribed b y the arbitration agreement or submission, or
regulated b y statu te, a r bitra tors have a general d iscretion a s
to the m o d e of condu.cting the proceedi ngs and are n o t
bound by formal ru les o f procedur e and evidence, a n d the
standard of review of arbi tration p rocedures is rTterely
whether a

a n arb i tr a ti o n has
fundamental l y fair hearing. s 1

49

party

to

been

denied

a

The Revised Uni form Arbitration Act makes this explicit.

An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the
arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of
the proceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the
power to hold conferences vvith the parties to the arbitration proceed ing
before the hearing and, among other matters, determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
A CT § 1 5 (a), 7 U.L.A. 2 (2000) .
Berhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 1 98, 203 (1956); D.E.I., Inc. v.
Ohio and Vicinity Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed. App'x 1 64, 1 70 (6th Cir.
2005) (" Arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and
the standard for judicial review of arbitration procedures is merely whether a
party to arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing." ) (quoting Nat' I
Post Office Mailhandlers v . U.S. Postal Service, 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1 985));
Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Marrowbone Dev. Co., 232 F.3d 383,
389 (4th Cir. 2000) ("An arbitrator typically retains broad discretion over
procedural matters . . . . ); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) (" By agreeing
to submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his courtroom rights 
including that to subpoena w itnesses - in favor of arbitration 'with all of its well
known advantages and drawbacks."') (quoting Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post, Co. 442 F .2d 1 234, 1 238
(1971)); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v . Southwire Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1 980) (" [A]rbitrators are charged with the duty of
determining what evidence is relevant and what is irrelevant, and that barring a
clear showing of abuse of discretion, the court will not vacate an award based on
improper evidence or the lack of proper evidence."); In re Arbitration Between
United States Turnkey Exploration, Inc. and PSI, Inc. (In re Turnkey Arbitrati on),
577 So.2d 11 31, 1 135 (La. Ct. App. 1 991) .
5 1 In re Turnkey Arbitration, 577 So. 2d 1 131, 1 135 (1991 ) .
UNIF. ARBITRATION
so

"

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22

JUDICIAL NON-iNTERFERENCE PRJNCI PL.E

2009]

to

'1015

Particularly following the 1996 Arbitration Act, English ! a w i�
the scune effect/:! as arc other common law jurisdk tions. ;_1

:> .

MANDATORY PROCEDuRAL REQUIREJ\IE[\;TS IN 1Nl£1<N.;\ TION.L\L

A RBI rRATlON
The pm·ties' freedom to �gree upon the arbitral procedures, and
lhe t1·ibuna l ' s discretion to adopt such procedures (absent contrary

agreen1ent),

are

subject

to

the

mandatory

cl pplicable national C:md i n ternational iaw.

requirements

of

As discussed below, in

most cases, particulmly i11 developed l egc1 l r·egimes, a p p EcBble
n1anda tory law

i m p oses only very

general,

albeit

irnport.:mt,

guarantees of procedural fairness C"md regulclrily.
5. 1 .

NlmJr!otury Procedural Protections under Jutcmationa!
Arbilrnlion Co11Ve11tio1LS

All

leading

i n ternational arbitration conventions

indirectly

recognize and give effect to mandatory requirements of procedural
fairness and re gul a r ity of the arbitral
permitting arbitral

uwards t o be

proceedings.

They do so b y

denied recogn ition

i f basic

requirements of procedural fairness have not been salisfied, while
leaving room for non-discrin1inatory, non-idiosyncn1tic rules of

52 Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 34(1) (Eng.) (" [l shall be for the tribunal to
decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to
agree any matter.''); ABB Attorney General v. Hochtief Airport GmbH, [2006]
EWIIC 388, ,1 67 (Comm.) (Eng.) ("It is not a ground for intervention that the
court considers that it might have done things differently ."); Pet.roships Pte Ltd of
Singapore v, Petec Trading & lnv. Corp. of Vietnam (The Petro Ranger) [2001] 2
EWHC 4181 419 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (award may be annulled under § 68(2)(a) only
"where it can be said that what hCls happened is so far removed from what can
reasonably be expected of the arbitral process, that the Court will take action").
53 See, e.g., Commercial Arbitrati.on Act, R.S.C., c. 17, § 19(2) (1985) (Can.)
(''Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may , subject to the provisions of
this Code, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The
power conferred upon the arbitr(-11 tribunal includes the power to determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence."); International
Arbitration Act, 1974, c. V, art. 19(2) (Austl.) ("Failing such agreement, the arbitral
tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the arbih·ation in such
manner as it considers appropriate. The pow12r conferred upon the arbitral
tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of any evidence."); Arbitration Act, 1996 S.R. No. 99, § 19(2) (N.Z.)
("Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribt.U1al may, subject to the provisions of
this Schedule, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.
The power conJerred u pon the arl>itral lTibumd includes the power to dt:?termine
tbe ndn1issibilitv, relevance, materialitv, and weight of any evidence.") ,
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mandatory national l a w a i m e d a t ensuring procedu r a l fairness a n d
equ a l i ty to opera te.
Article V ( l ) (b) o f the N e w York Conven t i o n is representa tive,
permi tti n g non-recogn it i on of a n award where " [ t ] he party against
whom the a vva r d is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appoi ntment of the arb i trator or of the arbitration proceed ings or
"
was o therwise u n nble to present lzis case . 54 Arti c l e V (2) (b) of the
Convention is also p o tentially applicable in cases o f serious
procedural

u n fai rness,

p ermitting

n on-recognition

of

arbitral

a ward s for violati ons of l oc a l public policy, i nc l u d i n g procedura l
p ublic policies.ss
fea t u re

similar

T h e European and I nter-American C o n ventions
provisions.56

The

appl ica tion

of

manda tory

s ta n dards o f procedural fairness under these various international
i ns truments has been termed '' intern a tional p rocedural public
p o li cy" by s o m e commentators .57
Articles V (l ) (b) and

V(2) (b)

of the New York Convention and

parallel provisions of o ther conventions have been interpre ted to
afford the p ar ties a n d arbitral tribunal substantial freedom to
establish the arbitral procedure s . 58

Nonetheless, these provisions

permit national courts to d eny recognition to arbitral a w ar d s that
are based upon fun d amentally unfair, arbitrary, o r unbalanced
procedures, a p p lying e i ther a u n iform internati onal s ta n d ar d of
procedu r a l fairness under Article V (l ) (b) or local procedural public
policies and procedural p ro tections guaranteed b y mandatory
national law under Article

V(2) (b) .59

Both of thes e p r o v isions

provide limited grounds o n which e i ther the p arties' procedural
54

New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V (1 ) (b) (emphasis added).
Id. art. V(2) (b) .
56 European
Convention, supra note 1 7, art. IX(1) (b); Inter-American
Convention, s upra note 1 8, arts. 5 (1 ) (b), 5 (2) (b) .
57 See Franz Schwarz & Helmut Ortner, Procedu ral Ordre P u blic a n d
the
In ternationalization of Public Policy in A rbitration in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION Y.B. 1 33
(Christian Klausegger et al. eds., Stampfli 2007); Fernando Mantilla-Serrano,
Towards A Transna tional Procedu ral P ublic Policy, in TOWARDS A UNIFORM
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? 1 68, 168 (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer et al. eds.,
Juris Publishing 2005) (describing how a great majority of nations has agreed to
the same principles of international arbitration procedure, thereby creating a
transnational procedural public policy); Stephen M . Schwebel & Susan G . Lahne,
Public Polin; and A rbitral Procedu re, i n COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
PoLICY IN ARBITRATION 206 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (discussing the uniform
transnational principles within public policy that shape arbitral procedure).
ss See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
5 9 See 2 Born, s upm note 1, at 2740-46 (outlining possible sources of standards
for procedural fairness under the New York Convention) .
55
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a greemen ts, o r a n arbitral tri bunal's proced ural o rders (absent
a greement of t h e parties), can be overri dden by na tional l a w for
purposes of recogni ti o n proceedings.
The procedural standards applicable under Art i c l e V ( l ) (b) are
not national, b u t instead i n1pose a u nifon11 inte rnational standard
rega r d ing p rocedura l o p portunities to b e heard . r)o

This public

pol icy applies uniformly in all Contracting Sta tes and does not
pe r mi t individ ual states to deny recognition to a w a r d s based on
l ocal laws o r public p o l icy.61

These i nternational sta n d ards of

procedural fairness are related to, and i nformed by, sta ndards of
fair and equitab l e treatment that have developed in the context of
international investment l a w . 6 2
The procedural public policy applicab l e under A r ti c l e V ( 2) (b) i s
d i fferent in character fro m the standards appl icable u n d e r Article
V (l ) (b); Article V (2) (b) establishes a n e xcep tiona l escape device
based on l ocal public p o licy rather than u niform international
standards, w hich does not affect the v a l i d i ty or enforceab i l i ty of
Thus, Article V (2) (b) permi ts a
the award i n o ther states. 6 3
Contracting State to rely o n its o w n national public p o licies to deny
recognition to a n a w ard, just as it may invoke i ts own local
procedural p ublic p o l icies to a n nu l a n i n ternational arbitral award
made loca l l y .
There have been s u ggestions that, f o r purposes b o th of non
recogni t i o n of a n award under Article V (2) (b) and ann u l ment of an
award made locally, the relevant procedural p u b l ic p o licy i n
international cases mu s t, under the Conventi o n, b e internationa l . 64

60

See

id.

61

See id.
6 2 See id.; Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1 989

I.C.J. 1 5, 76 (July 20) (contrasting procedural fairness required by international l aw
with arbitrariness and noting that " [a]rbitrariness is not so much something
opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law. This idea was
expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of ' arbitrary action'
being 'substituted for the rule of law.' It is a wilful [sic] disregard of due process
of Jaw . . . . " (citations omitted)); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment: Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.
[Country] art. 5 (2) (a), Nov. 2004, http:/ jwww.ustr.gov/ assets/Trade_Sectors
/ Investment/Model_BIT / asset_upl oad_£ile847_6897.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model
BIT] ('"fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world " ) .
63 See 2 BoRN, supra note 1 , a t 2827-33, 2841-2851 .
6-1 See, e.g., Schwebel & Lahne, supra note 57, at 209 (" increasingly recognizing
that narrow, nationalistic grounds of public policy that might be properly
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That position tcsls on the desirabi] j ty of applying uniform, neLttral
in ten1c1tion.:1 l standitrds, particularly a s to proced ural rnattcrs of
which basic concepts o f fairness and equc:llity are broadly sin1ilar in
m o s t states.
This argument is u I t i m a tely impossible to accept, however, a t
least a s a malLcr L)f interpreting the Convention's requirements. As
discussed iu_ti'a, il is relc1tively clear that both Article

V(2)(b)

and the

Convention's trett t m c n t of a nn u l ment contcmplat·e lhc possibility
of tbe a �1 p l ication l)f local and nC� tional public policics.h"' Requiring
the application ot uniforrn international procedural public pol icies
would contr<ldict the rule reserved for the local public policies and
mandatory

IC'nvc; of Contracting States under Lhe Convention.

Despite this, there is a substantial argument that Article I l o f the

New

York

Comrention

and

parallel

provJStons

of

other

international arbitration conventions should not be in terpreted as
leaving Conlracling States entirely free to impose local procedures
on local ly-seated inlernational arbitrations.
Rather,

the Convention

internt:�tional

l i mits

on

is

the

best

in terpreted

proced ural

as

prescribing

requirem.en t s

that

Contracting States may apply to international arbitral proceedings,
either in a recognition proceeding under Article V(2)(b) or in an
am1ulment o r other proceeding in the arbitral seat. Specifically, the
Convention

should

be

i n terpreted

as

requiring

that

local

proced u r a l requirements be exceptions to the general principle of
party au tonomy that are tailored to safeguarding t h e equality of
the parties and their opportunities to be heard, and as precl uding
Contracting States from imposing discrimina tory or i diosyncratic
local proced ural rules on international arbitrations.6o

Under this

interpretation, a Contracting State could not deny any role for the
parties' procedural a u tonon'ly .in international arbitrations, and
domestic procedural rules would apply regardless o f what the

in domestic cases are i na ppropriate In international cases") (q uoting
Howard Holtzman, ConllltCJLlllrtf, ill INTERNATJONAL ARBITRATION, 60 YEARS ON: A
LOOK AT THE FUTURE 361, 364 (1984)); see also Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard,

applicable

FiJLa! IL!i Reporl u n Public Policy rrs a Bar to Enforcement of lnternationnl Arbitral
Awards, 19 ARB. IN"r'L 249, 251 n.10 (2003) (noting that most na tional legislation
indudes pLtblk

po licy ) .
65

policy exceptions, although some refers

See Yfantili<1-Serrano, stlpm note 57, at 1 89-90

applying

transnational

N>

Sec

1

(noting

difficulties in

procedma l public policy); 2 BORN, supra note 1, <.1t 2554-60,

2830-38.

BOR;.J, �upm note

23, 2627-46, �728-�0.

to in terna tiona l public

l, at 1 258-70; 2 BOI\N, s11prn n ote 1, at 2.556-60, 2.620-
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parties agreed. Thus, a Contracting State ought not be clble to deny
effect to Z�ny p rocedural agreem.ent between lhe paTties ( for
example, by imposing local litigation procedures on every
arbitration conducted locally, regardless of the parties' <:1greement)
to deny effect to any chojce by the parties of Cl fo re ign arbitral
institution's arbitration nlles (for examp le, by denying effect to
agreem.ents selecting the UNCITRI-\L, ICC, or CfET AC Ru lcs), or to
deny effect to lhe parties' choice of a foreign arbitral se21t (for
example, by requiring that all cu bitrations be cm1d ucted locolly).
These results violate the basic premise of pilrty a u tonomy
underlying A rticles 11(3) e1 n d V(l )(d), as well as Lbe Convention's
objeclives of fa c i litat i ng the enforcem�nt of agreements to arbitrate
and the international arbitral process. Equally, in recognition
actions, these resu l ts would convert the role of local pub I ic policy
under Article V(2)(b) from providing an exceptional escape device
to mandating affirmatively a con1prehensive procedural code;
again, that is contrary to the Convenlion's structure and treatment
of the public policy exception generally.
Rather, in both
annulment actions and in recognition actions opplying Article
V(2)(b), the Convention should be interpreted as permitting
Contracting States to apply, as an exceptional escape device, only
non-discriminatory local procedural protections that are consistent
with state practice under the Convention. This interpretation of
the Convention, which mandates structural limitations on
Contracting States' reliance on local public policies, parallels the
similar li1nitations Articles II and V in1pose on the pern1issible
grounds for a Contracting State to deny effect to the validity of a n
international arbitration agreement o r to annul a n international
arbitral award.67
Finally, even if the Convention were interpreted as allowing
Contracting States complete freedom to in1pose rnandatory
procedural requirements on international arbitrations that are
seated l ocally, i t is clear that other Contracting States are free to
recognize arbitral awards that are annu.l1ed on the basis of
idiosyncratic or discriminatory local procedural requirements.
That is contemplated expressly by Article V(l)(d), which gives
priority to the parties' procedural autonomy, and by Article VII,
which leaves Contracting States free to recognize awards on more

r7

hi.

at

2556-60, 2838-40.
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hberal grounds than those under Article \l.bs Indeed, other
Contracting Ste1 tes nre in principle required, by virtue of Articles
U(3) and V(1) (b), to recognize arbih·al awards that have been
annulled i n the arbitral seat on the basis of national laws that
prescribe mand a to ry discriminatory or id iosyncratic procedural
requirements.�'�''
5.2. Mnutintory Proccdurnl Protections uuder Nntionol A rbitration
Legis/a I it111

Consistent vvith the New York Convention, most developed
legal systems do not impose significant mandatory limitations on
the freedom of the parties or the arbitral tribunal to conduct the
arbitration. Rather, parties are free to agree to arbitral procedures
that suit their interests witl.1in very deferential mandatory limHs
and arbitrators are empowered to prescribe arbitTal procedures
when the parties have made no agreement on the subject. ?O
Nevertheless, legislation and/ or judicial decisions i n most
developed jwisdictions require that arbitral proceed ings seated on
local territory satisfy minin1al standards of procedural fairness and
equality. These star1dards are variously referred to as requiring
"due process," "natural justice," "procecl ural regu la rity or fa i r
and equitable treatm_ent."71
The UNCTTRAL Model Law is illustrative of this basic,
mandatory requirement of procedural fairness. Article 18 of the
Model Law requires that " [t]he parties shall be trented with equality
"

"

and each party slznll be given n fu/1 opportunity of presenting his case" .n

6S

See sup ra

at 2764-74.
69 See

suprn

notes 12-13 and accompanying text; see- nlso 2 BORN, supm note 1 ,
notes 14-16 a,nd accompanying text; �ec also 2

BORN, s11pm

note 1,

at 2689-99.
70

Sec supra

notes 11-36 and accompanying text.
As discussed above, most national arbitration legislation imposes
mandatory procedural requirements on arbitrations with their seat on local
territo ry . See UNCTTRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, supra note 9,
,111; UNCITRA L, MODEL LAW arts. 1(2), 18; Federal Statute on Private
International Law, RS 291 arts. 176(1), 1 82(3) (Switz.); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23,
§§ 2(1 ), 33 (Eng.); Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, arts. 3(1), 25 (Japan).
n UNOTRAL, MODEL LAW art. 18 (emphasis added).
Sec HowARD M.
H.OLTZMf\f\JN & JOS"PH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE l.JNOTRAL MODEL LAW ON
71

INTERNATIONAL (OMMERCif\L ARBITRATTON: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND (O:VIMENTARY

550 (1989) ("Article 18 l"'Stablishes the fundamental principlc.>s thnt in all
arbitrations under Lhe Law each party must be tre,1ted with equality anJ be given
a full opportunity tct pr�sent i1.is c-ase.'').
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
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The Model Law also mCikes clear that this is a manda tory provision
for locally-seated arbitrations, which overrides contrary agreement
by the parties or actions by a tribunaJ.73 Similarly, Article 182(3) of
the Swiss Lavv on Private l nternationcll Law provides, again in
manda tory terms, that, " [ r ]egardless of the procedure chosen [by
the parties and/or tribunal], the Arbitral tribunal shcdl ensure
equal treatn1ent of the parties a n d the right of both parties to be
heard in an a d vcrsc-wicll proceeding."7-t Other developed nationa I
arbitration regimes are simil.ar in their approaches lo mt1ndatory
procedural protections in arbitrations with their seats on local
terri torv.T5
In the United States, lhe FAA has been interpreted as imposing
similar mandatory requirements of bCisic procedllral fairness,
emphasizing eq ua l ity of treatment, an adequate opportunity to be
heard, and procedural regularity _76 J Lldicial decisions in other
leadjng jurisdictions are broadly sin1ilar,n as are arbitral awards7R
and institu tiona[ rules.'9
73 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW art. 19(1).
The same guarcmlees ure also
contained in the (related) provisions of national law regard·ing the annuln1ent
and/ or t·ecognition of arbitral awards. Thus, Articles 34(2)(a)(ii) and 36(1 )(a)(ii) of
the Model Law provide for annulment or non-recognition of an aw<1rd if "the
party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
.::1ppointmenl of a n arbitrator or was otherwise unable to present his case,"
UNCTTRAL, MODEL LAW arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 36(1)(a)(ii). See 2 BORN, �upm note 1, a t 2573-95, 2736-46.
7·1 Federal Statute on Private International Law, RS 291 art. 182(3) (Switz.).
See Schneider, supm note 22, 184; BERNHARD BERGER & FRANZ KELLERHALS,
INTERNATrONALE UNO INTERNE SCHlEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ � 1003
(2006).
75 Sec, e.g., ZiviJprozefSordnung [ZPO] § 1042(1) (P.R.G.); judici<d Code, arts.
1693{1), 1 694 ( Belg.); Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure], bk. 4, arts. ]036,
1039(1)-(2) (Neth.); Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, journal OJ.ficiel de Ia
Republique Fran<;aise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France), p. 1398, reprinted in
N.C.P.C. arts. 1502(4), 1502(5) (Fr.); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 33(1) (Eng.);
International Arbitration Act, 2002, ch. 143A, §§ 3(1), 15A(l) (Sing.); UNOTRAL,
MODEL LAW art. 18; japanese Arbitration Law, supra note 28, art. 25 (''(1) The
parties shall be Lreated with equality in the arbitral proceedings. (2) Each party
shall be given a full opportunity of presenting its case in the arbitral
proceedings.").
76 Section 10 of the FAA contains the grotmds for vacating an arbitral award
subject to the domestic FAA. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 0 (2006). As
discussed infrn, section 10(3) permits annulment if "the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of e1ny
other misbehavior by which the righls of any party have been prejudiced."
7i See, e.g., MORS v. Super01arket Sys., Cour d' appel [ CA] [regic•na I court of
appt!al] Paris, Apr. 18 1991, 1995 Rev. arb. 448; Imrnoplan v. tv·fercure, Com
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Every j u risdiction has i t s own particular national s t a n d a r d o f
" due

p rocess"

or

" na tural

j u s tice"

tha t

mus t

arbitrations w i t h t h e i r seats w ithin l o c a l terr i tory .

be

a p p l ie d

to

B o t h i n verbal

formulation and specific a p p l ication, these standards d i ffer from
s ta te to s t a t e .
F o r the most part, howev er, t here a r e o n l y l i m i te d d i fferences
a mong the national s tandards of due process tha t are a p p l i e d to
the i n terna ti onal arbi tral process i n developed j urisdictions .

That

is i n part bec ause of the very deferential approach that i s taken in
most developed l egal s ystems to the par ties' procedu r a l a u tonomy
i n international arbi tra tions .

I t is also i n part bec ause o f the steps

t o·wards " convergence" that have occurred w i th regard t o l i t i ga ti o n
p rocedures in d eveloped j urisdictions o v e r t h e past d e c a d e . so
T hus, i n most leading j urisdi c ti ons, mandatory n a t i o n a l l aw
imposes only very limi ted restric tions on the parties' a u tonomy to
a gree upon arbitral procedures.

I n general, only a greement to

egregiously unfair, u nconscionable or w h o l ly arbitrary p r oce dures

d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 19, 1 990, 1 991 Rev. arb. 1 25;
Gbangbola v_ Sm.ith & Sheriff Ltd, (1998) 3 All E.R. 730, 731 (Q.B.) (discussing
overturning a rbitral awards based on "serious irregularity"); Bundesgericht
[BGer] [Federal Court] Dec 30, 1 994, 13 ASA B u l l . 217, 221 (1 995) (Switz.);
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] September 24, 1 981, 7 Ob 623 / 81,
1 982 OJZ 77 (Austria); Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] (Supreme Court] September 6,
1 990, 6 Ob 572/90, 1 991 RdW 327 (Austria).
7 8 See, e.g., Aryeh v. Iran, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272, 287-88 (1997)
(" (B]oth parties to the case are entitled to have an equal opportunity to present
written submissions and to respond to each other's submissions. This also means
that the parties must have an equal opportunity to go through the evidence and
the arguments submitted by the other party, and to prepare their own position
and arguments in advance of the hearing."); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,
Decision on Crown Privilege and Solicitor-Client Privilege (Sept. 6, 2000), � 1 . 5 (" it
is an overriding principle (Article 1 5) that the parties be h·eated with equality"),
at
http:/ / www .naftaclaims.com/ Disputes/ Canada/ Pope
available
/ PopeAwardOnCrownPri vilegeSolicitorClientPrivilege. pdf.
79 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, G.A Res. 31/98, Art. 1 (2), U . N . Doc. A / RES/ 35/52 (Dec. 1 5, 1 976) ("These
Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of the Rules is in conflict
with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties
cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail").
s o See, e.g., Int'l Bar Assoc. [IBA], IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Int'l
Commercial Arbitration, (June 1 , 1 999) available a t http:/ / int-bar.org
/ images/ downloads/ IBA % 20rules % 20on % 20the % 20taking%20of% 20Evidence
.pdf (setting out the principles for the taking of evidnce in international
commercia l arbitration); ALI/U N IDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATiONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE (200-±) (setting out rules for the evidence phase of international
arbitration proceedings); 2 BORN, s upra note t at 1789-92.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
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will be held unenforceable. As one U.S. decision, vvhich cldOpled

e1

particularly robust vicvv of the parties' a u t o non1y, p u t it:
Short 0f a u thorizing trial by battle or ordeal
doubtfully,

by

a

pC1nel

of three

monkeys,

or,

more

parties

can

stipulate to wh<'ltever procedures they want to govern the
arbitration of their disputes; parties are as free to specify
idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to specify any
other terms in their contract.�'t
Somewhat less expansively
English Arbilration Act declares:
<lgree

how

their dispu tes

are

(and
'1

less colorfully),

the

1996

the parties should be free to

resolved, subject

only

Lo

such

safeguards as are necessary in the public i n terest.��s�
This provision is correctly described as giving effect to the
principle of "party Rutonomy, that is to say that the parties should
be free to agree how their disputes are resolved subject only to
such safeguards as are necessary in the public i n terest. "::>:"

A

decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal reflected the san1e deference
to the parties' proced ural autonomy and the arbitrators' discretion:
It should be underlined that procedm:al public policy will
constitute only

a

si.rn p l e exclusion provision, n a mely that i t

w i l 1 1nerely have a protective function and w i l l n o t generate
any positive rules.

This i s because the legisla ture d i d not

desire that procedural public policy should be extensively
interpreted and that there should arise a code of arbitral
procedure to which the p rocedure, a s freely selected by the
parties should be su bjected.84

81 Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994);
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coacl1 Emp. o£ Am., AF.L. v. Conn.,
112 A2d 501, 503 (Conn. 1955) ("If fan arbih·ation agreementj specifies methods of
procedure £or the arbitration, the arbih·ators will be bound to that procedure
unless i t is in violation of lav,, or public poliE:y."); BERGER & KELLERHALS, supra note
741 � 1018 (noting that parties ccumot in general waive right to fair hearing and
equal treatment, but can waive the minimum requirement of due process in
circwnscribed circumstances or after individual circumstances occur).
s2 Arbitration Act, 1996 c. 23, § l(b) (Eng.).
83 Alban v. Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2007] EWHC 1879, �'11 (Ch) (U.K.).
See also MERKIN, Sltprn note 23, �10.50 ("The 1996 Act is specific in its intention to
signpost a move away from arbitrations which resemble court proceedings").
!54 Bundesgericht [BGerl [Federal C()urt) Dec 30, 1994, 13 J\ssn. Switz. Arb.
Bull. 2.17, 221 (Switz.).
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That is, the procedun1l protections that manda tory law or
public policy impose do not include some general procedu rc:1 l code
or regime (''\rvil.l not generate any positive rules"), but are i nstet'ld
spcci fie,

tailo:·ed

protections (" a simple exclusion

provision")

a i n.1ed al preventing a fundamental! y unfair procedure from being
agreed to by the parties
There is

.; m

or

j m posed by the arbitral tribunal.

in1portnnt distinction between the

a pplicati o n

of

mandatory l en \ l i m i ts to the par ties' proced ural agreements and
'

/

the applica ti on of mandatory law limits to the arbitra1 tribunal's
procedural directions. Although il is of course possible for p a r t ies'
procedural agreements to be unconscionably one-sided or unfair,
natiorwl courts are very reluctant to reach such a conclusion i n
cases

involving

commercial

part ies.ss

National

courts

are

deferential, bLLt less so, lo procedural d i rections made by arbitrc-d
tribunals i n the absence of the pa r ties consent to those d i rections.s11
'

This

distinction

is

appropriate.

Although

the

parties'

arbitration agreement w i l l ordinarily grant the arbitrators broad
procedural discretion, t h i s is not intended to be, and cam1ot be
regarded as, u n l i m i ted.

A

tri bunal s imposition of unfair or
'

arbi tra ry procedures, over a party's objection, is very di fferent
from

a

party's

knowing

and

informed

acceptance

of

such

procedures, etther for reasons of its own or i n return for other
benefits .57

ss

See, e.g., id.; 8nmvati, 28 F.3d a t 709 (recognizing parties' broad authority to
adopt procedural m.easures of their d10ice); Amalgamated Ass'!l of St. Elec. Ry. &
Motor Conclt E111ployees of A111erica, 112 A.2d a t SOl ("If [an arbitration agreementj
specifies methods of procedure for the ar·bitration, the arbitrators will be bound to
that procedure unless it is in violation of law or public policy."); BERGER suprn note
49, § 1018 (noting that parties cannot in general w2ive right to fair hearing and
equal treahnent, but can waive the minimum requirement of due process in
circumscribed circumstances or after individual circumstances occur).
S6 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Schernecker, 208 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Wis. 1973)
( Arbih·ators have a good deal of discretion in cutting off repetitious or
clllnulative testimony but they have gone. beyond the limit of discretion when
they refuse to hear evidence pertinent and material to this djspute."); Paklito
Investment Ltd. v. Kleckner East Asia Ltd., 2 H.K.L.R. 39 (HC 1993) (I-LK.)
(denying enforcement of award because defendant was not given the opportunity
to comment on the report produced by the expert appointed by the tribunal);
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON lNTERNATlONI\L COMMERCIAL ARB!TRATTON §
1698 (E. Gaillnrd & ]. Savage eds., 1999); MERKlN, supra note 23, � � 14.10, 14.12.
See nls0 infm notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
R7 The same distinction is drawn in the annulment and recognition contexts.
See infrn notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
"
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/\[though mc-mdG�tory naliondl pro(edural gLtarcm tees are i n
prjnciplc a p p l icable lo arbitrations seated i n local territory, the
a p p lication of nat ionCil 1 CI w to override the parties' agreement on
arbitral procedures cnn violate guarantees for party a u tonomy in
leading

international

viola tions

of

conventions.

non-discrin1inatory,

As

d i scussed

above, only

non-idiosyncratic

pnKedurcd

norms tailored to safeguard the fairness of the arbi tral process
sho u l d be grotmds for refusals to give effect lo agreements on
arbi tr,i l procedu res.�:-

F i nally, as d iscussed below, violations of

mandatory procedural requirements should be redressable only a t
the end o f the arbitral process through non-recogn i t i o n o f the
arbitral award - i n annulment or recogn ition proceed i n gs - n ot by
i n terl o c u tory judicia I intervention i n the ongoing arbitra I process.ll'�

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL N ON-INTERFERENCE I N l'JTER. "AT10Ni\L

6.

ARBITRA-I LO. .
There is
principles

Cl

of

i n ternational

further principle which complements the foregoing
international
arbitration

procedure.

arbitral

conventions

and

Leading

national

statu Les recognize the principle of judicial

arbitration

non-interference i n

arbitral proceedings, albeit usually indirectly.

The New York

Convention reflects an indirect treatment of the issue, w h i l e other
instruments are more explicit and d i rect.QO
This

principle

of judici3l

non-interference

in

international

arbitral proceed ings is no less - and arguably more - important
than

the

foregoing

r u les

of

procedural

d i scretion and procedural fairness.

autonon1y,

arbitrator

Nonetheless, the prin.ciple of

judicial non-in terference has received substantially less a t tention.
Indeed, many works on international arbitration either e n t irely
ignore the principle

or

give i t n o more than passing attention.

gs Sec s11pra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Tn annulment actions, the
courts of the arbilTal seat wottld be afforded greater scope to apply local
mandatory rules and public policies CIS escape devices than in recognition actions,
but international limits should nonetheless apply. ld. See nlso injrn notes 97-102
c�nd accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanyi.n.g text.
90 As discussed above, the Geneva Convention and the Geneva Protocol
confirm the parties' autonomy to agree upon arbitral procedures (as do the New
York, Europecm 8nd Inter-American Conventions). See supra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text. This nlle mily suggest, but does not necessarily require, <1
principle of judicial non-interferen(E'.
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6 . 1 . Principle of jud icial Non -1n teljcrence Under

the NezD York

Co! z ven tio 1 1
N o thing i n the N e w Y o rk Convention expressly prov i d e s that
nati onal

courts

applications
arbi tration s

shall

not

concerning

(e.g.,

entertain

interlocutory

the ongoing

conduct o f

procedural
i n ternational

to dispute a tribunal's procedural t i n1 e ta b l e,

disclosure orders, or evidentiary rulings) .

Nonetheless, Article

I I (3) of the Convention provides tha t national courts sha l l " refer
the parties to arbi trab on" after ascertaining th e existence of a valid
arbitration a greement w i thou t making provision for any fu rther
j u dicia l ro l e i n the arbitra tion proceed ings.91 At the s a me time that
nei ther A rticl e Il (3) nor any oth er part of the Conven tion p r o vi des
for judicial involvement i n esta b lishing, moni toring or overseeing
the procedures used in the arbitra tion, Article V of the Convention
defines the role of nationa l courts w ith exclusive r eference to
recognition and enforcement of arbitral a w ards .92
As discussed above, Article

II(3)

i s a m andatory provisi o n,

requiring tha t national courts e ither dismiss or stay c l aims that are
subj ec t to a valid arbi tration a greement and refer the p a rties to
arbitration.<J3

The

only

exception

to

this

princi p l e

involves

interlocu tory j u d icial decisions o n jurisdictional challenges to the
arbitration a greemenV4 which are contemplated b y Article II of the
Convention.95

The effect of this requirement - particularly as

i nterpreted i n l i ght of the Convention' s purposes ( i . e . , to prescribe
uniform i nternational rules that facilitate the arbitral process) and
structure ( i . e ., only p rovi d i ng for review of awards in Article V ) 96 i s to forbid the courts of Contracting States from s upervising or
9 t New York Convention, supra note 1 2, art. II(3). See 1 BORN, supra note 1 , at
1 01 4-20, 1024-31; A LBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, Enforcement of the A rbitra tion
Agreelllent, in THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1 958 1 31, 1 37 (Kluwer
Law and Taxation 1981) ("it is a fundamental principle of arbitration, and
especially international commercial arbitration, that an arbitrator adjudicates the
entire case and that a national court does not interfere with his decision-making
powers"; Article Il(3) can therefore be said to have the effect of a partial
incompetence of the court) .
92 See 2 BoRN, supra note 1, at 2702-78.
93

Jd.

94

Id.

95 The only other exceptions involve judicial assistance in constituting the
arbitral tribunal, provisional relief in aid of arbitration and judicial assistance in
the taking of evidence - all of which are supportive of the arbitral process and
either conten1plated by or consistent with the Convention. Id.
96

Id.
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second-guessing the ongoi n g procedu ral conduct of a rb itrati o n s .
Absent contrary a greement b y the p arties, Artic l e I I (3) req uires that
national courts simply " refer the parties to arbitration," vvith any
subsequent

judici a l

involvement

l imited

to

a nnulment

or

recognition proceedi ngs, and does not perm it them to make
supervise

procedural

decisions

in

the

cou rse

of

an

or

ongoing

arbitration 97
Thi s

is

a

fundamentally

important

Convention tha t is not always app reciated .

consequence

of

the

Arti cle I l (3) does not

leave the principl e of judicial non-inte rference in internationa l
arbitrations to national l egisl a ti on.

Rather, Article I I (3) i mposes

this obl igati on directly on Contracting States, for b i d ding th e i r
courts from doing anything other than referring the p arties t o a
valid arbitration a greem ent or to arbitratio n pending a n award.
6 . 2 . P rin ciple of Ju dicial Non -In te1jeren ce U n d e r t h e In ter-A merican

Co n ven tion

The

Inter-American

Convention i s

even

more

s p ecific

in

adopting a principle of judicial non-interference in the a rb itra l
process than the New York Convention. A s noted above, Article

3

of the Conventi on incorporates the IACAC Rules, including Article
1 5 (1 ) thereof, which grants the tribunal authority " to conduct the
arbitration in such manner as it considers a ppropriate . " 9S

These

provisions, coupled w ith the a bsence of any provisions for general
judicial supervision of ongoing arbitral proceedings, leave no room
for interlocutory judici a l intervention in the procedural conduct of
the arbitration.
6 . 3 . Prin ciple of Judicial Non -In te1jerence Under the E u ropean

Conven tion

The European Convention also affirms the princ iple of judicial
non-interference in the arbitr a l proceeding. Article IV( 1 ) provides

9 7 See also

Matthieu de Boisseson,

A n ti-S u i t Inj u nctions Issu ed by National

Cou rts: At the Seat of the A rbitration or Elsewhere, in A NTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 65, 68 (E. Gaillard ed., 2005) (citing the Arbitral
Tribunal's enforcement of the arbitration agreements with limited to no deference
to local courts in a 2001 decision); Jose Carlos Fernandez Rozas, A n ti- S u i t
Inj u nctions Issued b y National Cou rts: Measu res Addressed t o the Parties o r t o the
A rbi trators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTEI<NATIONAL ARBITRATION, s upra, at 73,
81.
9 8 Inter-American Conv enti o n , supra note 1 9 , art. 3; l0JTER- A M . COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION COM:'v!' N R., s u p ra note 39, a r t 15(1 ) .
.
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that p arties " sh a l l be free to submit t h e i r disputes" to arbi tration,
and

" to

l ay

d o- vvn

arbitrators. " 99

the

Like

the

procedure
N ew

to

York

be

foll o vved

and

by

the

Tnter-An1erican

Conventions, nothi n g i n the European Convention provides for
j u d icial supervision o f arbitral p roced ures; instea d, it contemplates
na tional court i nvolvement in relation to j u r i s d ictional
decisions, 1 oo interim reliettcn and review of award s . 1 02 This l e aves

only

no room for national courts to supervise or regulate the arbitra tors'
procedural decisions .

6 . 4. Prin ciple of fudicia l Nm z - [rz teJfe ren ce u nder Na tio l lal Arbi t ra tion
Legisla tion

Arbitration statutes and judicial decisions i n most developed
j u risdictions are even more emphatic tha n interna tional arbitration
conventions regarding the principle of j udicial non-interference.
Article 5 of the U NCITRA L Model La w provides " [i ] n n'la tters
governed b y this Law, no co u rt shall in tervene excep t whe re so
provided in this L mu .

"

1 03

The M odel Law then sets forth l i mi te d

circ umstances involving j u d icial support for the arbitral process
(e.g., resolving j urisdictional obj ections, assisting i n c o nstitution of

the tribunaL granting p r o visional relief, considering a p pl i cations to
vacate awardsV04 but d oes not permit j u dicial s u p ervision of
procedural dec isions through interlocutory appeals or o therwise . 1 os
I n the words of one court asked to review i nterim d ecisions by a
tribunal:
I t is premature, in effect, at this stage of proceed i n gs, to ask
the Superior Court of Quebec to intervene on questions that

European Convention, supra note 1 7, art. IV(a) (b) (iii).
Id . arts. VI(1)-(3).
1o1 Jd . art. VI(4).
1 02 Jd . art. IX.
103 U N C ITRAL, MODEL LAvV, s upra note 4, art. 5 (emphasis added) .
104 Id. arts. 8, 9, 1 1 (3), 1 3, 14(1 ), 16(3), 1 7, 27, 34 and 36.
105 In drawing up the Model Law, the Working Group and the Secretariat
provided non-exhaustive lists of matters not governed by the Model Law and
therefore appropriate as matters on which a court may intervene under Article 5.
Those lists included a number o f procedural 1natters, such as the fixing o f fees and
costs and requests for deposits or security; consolidation of arbitral proceedings;
enforcement by a court of interim measures of protection ordered by the arbitral
tribunal. S ee HOWARD M. HOLZiv! ANN & jOSEPH E. N E UHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON I NTERNATIONA L COMlvfE RCI A L ARBITRATION:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 218 (1989) .
99

100

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22

2009)

JUDICIAL NON-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

1029

can t'ventuelly, and only, be remitted to it after a final
cwbitral award has been made . . . . The Quebec Superior
Court is not clothed with the power to examine [these
questions] at this moment, but only once the final arbitral
decision has been rendered. 10o
Arbitration legislation i n other jurisdictions i.s similar in c i the1·
excluding judicial supervision of arbitral procedu.xes, I07 or omitting
any provision for interlocutory j u dicial review or supervision of
arbitrators' procedura I rulings.WR Similarly, one New Zealand

Jllh

Compilquie N<:�tionalc Air France v. Mbt�ye, f2000] R.j .Q. 717 ( Can.) . Se,·
v. STET lnt'l, S.P./\, lJ99lJ] -15
O.R.3ct 183, paw. 21 (Ce�n.) (''Article 5 of the Model Law expressly limils the scope
for jLtdicial intervention except by application to set aside Lhe ;)Ward or to resist
enforcement of an award under one or rnore of tbe limited groLtnds sp<:·citied In
Articles 3-� or 36.").
107 Arbitration Act, 1 996, c. 23, § l(c) (Eng.) ("in matters governed by tl1is Part
the court should not intervene except as provided by this T-'ad')i lviEgKIN, supm
note 23; See Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA l2007J EWJ IC 571, � 71 (Crnnn•.)
(Eng.) ("This is consistent with the general approach of lhe 1 996 Act, which is tu
give as r:nuch power as po�sible to the parties and the arbitrators and to reduce the
role of the courts to that of a supporter ., . . ' ) , ld. ,l 67 ("[T]he underlying
principles of the 1996 Act.. . [is] minimum of interference in the arbitral process
by the courts, at least before an award is made"). The scope for the court to
intervene by injunction before an award is made by arbitrators is very limited. See
Hiscox Underwriting Ltd. v. Dickson Manchester & Co. [2004) EWHC 479 (Q.B.)
(Eng.) (holding that the court me�y intervene when an arbitral tribunal's po\iv�r is
ineffective); Vale do Rio Doce Navigacos SA v. Shanghai Bao Steel Ocerin
Shipping Co., (2000) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (holding that the court did not
have the power to permit service of an arbitration claim); see also ] . Jarvis & Sons
Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd. [2007] B.L.R. 439 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (holding
that the court lacks authority to review interim ruling by arbitral tribunal).
Section l(c) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996, provides that English courts
''should'' not-rather than "shall" or "may" not-intervene in arbitral
proceedings. This is intended to preserve-in narrowly-cabined and exceptional
circumstances- the inJ1erent judicial power to intervene to correct serious
injustices.
10s See, e.g., Judicial Code, arts. 1693-98 (Belg.) (providing that the patiies
shall determine their own rules of procedure and the arbitrators may rule on their
own jurisdiction)i Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, joumal Officiel de la
Republique Franc;aise Q.O.] [Official Gazette of France], p. 1 3 98, reprinted iJI
N.C.P.C. arts. 1460-68, 1494 (Fr.) (providing that arbitral tribunals are not
governed by the procedure applicable to norm.al French courts);
Zivilproze!Sordnung [ZPOJ § 1026 (F.RC.); Federal Statute on Prjvate
International Law! Dec. lS, 1 987, RS 291, arts. 180-187 (Switz.) (providing that the
parties to the arbitration may select t11eir rules of procedures and that arbitrators
may rule on their own jurisdiction); Arbitration Law, L?.IVl No. 138 of 2003, arts.
25-35 Oapan) (providing that the parties to the arbitration are free to select their
own rules of procedures so long as they do not offend Japanese public policy);
11/so Corporac1on Transne�cional de lnversiont:"s, S.A.

'
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decision rejected both <:�n application to review cln arbitrator's
interlocutory procedural directions and a requesL for a j udicizd
order enforcing those d irections, making clear the court's
11immed ie1te reluctance to be used as a 'cuckoo' to be whistled ou t
to exercise the coercive power of the State through its j u d i ci a l arm,
but vvithout any ability to rnakc an adjudication upon the
mattcr."I09 An English court adopted the same vievv, holding that
t he Engl ish Arbitration Act "conten1plates that once matters are
refened to arbitration, i t is the arbitral tribunal that wi 11 generally
deed wiJh issues of their jurisdiction and the procedure in the
arbitrotion up to a n award. 1' nu
J n the United States1 the statutory text of the FAA does not
expressly provide for judicial non-interference in arbitral
proceedings. Nonetheless, lower U.S. courts have repeatedly held
that judicial in tervention in pending arbitral proceedings (both
international and domestic) is improper to correct procedural
errors or evidentiary r u l i ngs. 111 As one U.S. federal trial court
Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'] People's Cong., Oct.
31, 1994, effective Sept. l, 1995), arts. 39-57 (P.R. C.).
H\'1
Weatherbend v. Oeka New Ze<lland Lld., [1997} 10 P.R.N.Z. 625, 631 (H.C.
1997) (The judge we1s "loathe to add to an interminable procedural wrangle
bet·ween these parties, but [was} not satisfied that it has been demonstrated thal l
have the authority or jurisdiction to intervene in the way which is sought."),
1 !(1
Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 8, � 70
(Comm.) (Eng.). See also Weatherhead v. Deka, [1997} 10 P.R.N.Z. at 631 (holding
that courts cannot nom1ally intervene until an award has been made, whereafter,
in appropriate cases, the award can be set aside and remitted to the arbitrators for
rehearing).
m See 2. BO�N, supra note 1, at 1780 (describing lack of interlocutory judicial
review of a.rbitTal tribunal's discovery rulings in U.S. courts); see, e.g., Aerojet-Gen.
Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[Jludicial
review prior to the rendition of a final arbitration award should be indulged, ii at
alJ, only in the most extreme cases."); Campania Panemen.a Maritima San
Gerassimo, S.A. v. J. E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1957)
(stating that "[ilt should not be the function of the District Court, after having
ordered an arbitration to proceed, to hold itself open as an appellate tribunal to
rule upon any questions of evjdence that may arise in the course of the
arbitration" and noting that interlocutory judicial review of arbitrators'
evidentiru·y rulings "result only in a waste of time, the interruption of the
arbitration proceeding, ru1d encourages delaying tactics . . . . " ); Krauss Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, lnc. 62 F.2d 1004, 1.005 (2d Cir. 1933) ("The
purpose of arbitration is essentially an escape from judicial trial . . . . ") ; Banco! y
CIA. S. En C. v. Bancolombia S.A., 123 F. Supp. 2d 771, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[Tlhe
court's authority to direct or oversee [an) cYrbitration is narrowJy confined . . . . In
particular, [the court] has little or no power to afford interlocutory review of
procedure1l matters, let a1one to determine at the outset what procedural rules are
io be applied.J')� foren10st Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, lnc., 25 f.R.D. 9, 1 1 (E.D.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
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dedan�d, " [ n]othing in the [FAA] conten1plates interference by the
courl in an ongoing arbitration proceeding." m Or, as another
court put it, to permit judicio\ review of arbi trators' intarlocutory
rulings vvould he "unth.inkable.'' 1U
National court decisions in leading civil law jurisdictions arc
similar. 114 The Paris Cour d'appel has affirmed lhe principle of
judicial non-in terference in emphatic terms, holding thal:
The exercise of the prerogatives attached to the
[,,rbitrators' authority], which is legitimate and a utonom.ous
in its own right, must be guaranteed in a totally
independent manner, as befjts any judge, without any

Pa. 1960) ("[J]n ,) proceeding before arbitrators neither the statute nor the rules
make available to any party thereto the discovery procedures provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 258 N.E.2d
561, 564 (Mass. 1970) (to allow judicial review of interlocutory arbih·al rulings
"would tend to render tJ1e proceedings neither one thing nor the other, but
transform them into a hybrid, part judicial and part arbitrationt'll"); Mobil Oil
Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil (lndonesia) Ltd., 372 N.E.2d 2J, 23 (N.Y. 1977)
("There is no authority for this court or any court to intervene at [the
interlocutoryJ �tate of the progression of the arbitration proceeding. , . for the
court to entertain review of intermediary arbitration decisions involving
procedure or �ny other interlocutory matter, would disjoint and unduly delay the
proceedings, thereby thwarting the very purpose of conservation."); see also
Tempo Shain Corp. v, Bertek, lnc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1 997) ("Federal courts
do not superintend arbitration proceecf.ings.
Our review is restricted to
determining whether the procedure was fW1damentally unfair.") (quoting
Teamsters, Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735 P. 2d 903, 906 (5th Cir.
1984)); UNlF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 18 cmt. 1, 7 lJ.L.A. 2 (2000) ("[Cjourts are very
hesitant to review interlocutory orders of an arbitrator.").
m Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Tnc., 685 F. Supp. 1 241, 1 242
(S.D. Fla. 1988) .
m Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Adair, 218 A.2d 79 1 , 794 (Pa. 1966).
m See
FrankfLu·ter Redaktion [BeckRS) June 28, 2006, 34 SchH 11/05
(Obetlandesgericht Munich) (F.R.G.) ("Decisions of state courts in arbitral matters,
in particular interference with pending arbitraJ proceedings, are not provided for
by statute and inadmissible"); Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLGZ]
Oct. 5, 2004, 2004 Sd1iedsVZ 31 6, 317 (F.R.G.) (noting the "principle that Gennan
courts do not take part in foreign arbitral proceedings"); Decisioni del Tribunale
federaJe svizzero [DTF] T1I 492, Tribunale federale [Federal Tribunal] Nov. 1, 1996,
122 (Switz..) (noting that the court's jurisdiction does not extend to examining
procedural orders or directives which can be amended or overruled during the
further course of the proceedings). See nlso PETROCHIL.OS, supra note 8, at 93
("[m]odern arbitration law overwhelmingly takes the view that it is up to the
parties and the tribunal to ens�llre the procedural propriety of the arbitral
procedures in the first instance, for the whole of the duration of the arbitration.
Lnstances of procedural misconduct will be censuxed after a final award has been
made.")� A. BAU!vlBACH ET AL, ZIVJLPROZESSORDNUNG § 1026 (66th ed. 2008).
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interference with the organization which set up the arbi tral
tribunal and thus exhausted its powers, and ·w ith o u t anv
intervention by the courts . n s
There are only isolated exceptions to the principle of judicial
non-interference, typical1y m ill-considered lovver court
decisions . 1 16
The principle of judicial non-interference in international
arbitral proceedings is vitally important .
J udicial orders
purporting to establish arbitral procedures would directly
contradict the parties' objectives in agreeing to arbitrate 
including particularly their desire for less formal and more flexible
proced u rcs, their desire for a high degree of party c ontrol over
such procedures, and their desire for " neutral" and expert a rbitral
procedures a dopted by a tribunal of the parties' choice, rather than
a national court.117 Interl ocutory judicial review of an arbitral
tribunal's procedura l decisions would frustrate all of these
objectives, while also in1 posing substantial risks of delay and
appellate second-guessing on the arbitral process . n s
These considerations go beyond matters of sound national
legislative policy, reflecting the implied premises of an a greement
to arbitrate international disputes . Absent express contractual
provisions to the contrary, they are given effect by the New York
Convention, which excludes interlocutory judicial involven1ent in
procedural decisions in an ongoing international arbitration. As
noted above, under Article II of the Convention (and similar
provisions in other conventions), as well as under leading national
arbitration regimes, the parties' agreement excluding interlocutory

m Chambre arbitrale de Paris v . Republique de Guinee, Paris Cour d'appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 18, 1 987, 1988 REV. ARB. 657. S ee also
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [court of original j urisdiction] Paris, Feb. 1 5,
1 995, 1 996 REV. ARB. 503.
11 6 See, e.g. , Tuesday Indus. v. Condor Indus., 1 978 (4) SA 379 (Prov. Divs.) at
383 (S. Afr.) (claiming power to review procedural ruling of tribunal, but not
exercising it); Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co., 1 23 Fed. App'x
481, 483 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that an agreement to arbitrate does not comple tely
oust a court of jurisdiction; rather, the court retains continuing supervision of
arbitration to ensure that arbitration is conducted within a reasonable time) .
1 1 7 See 2 BORN, supra note 1 , a t 1 785 -92 (discussing the importance of arbitral
tribunals' broad discretion over arbitral procedures).
1 1 s Interlocutory appeals are either u navailable or strictly limited in many
judicial systems, precisely because of the delays that such appea ls ca use to the
litigation process. The same rationale applies to arbitration.
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binding

on

Contracting States and the i r courts . 11 9
7.

The
arbitral

p r inci p l e

CONC LUSION

o f j u d icial

p roceed ings

is

interna tional arbi tration.

a

non-interfe rence
centra l

p i l l ar

m

of

internationa l
contemporary

Essential to the arbi tral process is the

freedom of parti es, and arbitra tors, to p roceed w i th their chosen
dispu te res o l u ti o n mechanism to a fina l a ward, which only then
may be s u bj ect to j u d ic i al rev i e w .

The existence of interlocu tory

chal l enges or appeals from arbitrators' p rocedural decisions \No u l d
have d e e p l y damaging consequences f o r the arbitra l process.

To

prevent these c onsequences, b o th the N e w York Convention and
other interna tional arbitration c onventions and national arbitr a tion
statutes e i ther expressly o r implicitly adopt a princ ip l e o f j udicial
non-interference i n interna tional arbitral proceedings.
seldom rem arked u pon,
ensuring the e fficacy

A l though

this p rinciple p l a y s a central role in

o f the

arbitr a l

process

as

a

means

of

international dispute reso lution.

11 9
Sec supra n o tes 14-15 a n d acc01npanying t e x t (noting tha t Article II of the
Convention requ i res courts of contracting states to refer parties to a v alid

a rbitration a greement to arbitration p u rsuant to such agreement, i f necessary, a n d
mu s t u p h o l d the agreement ' s arbitral r u l es and procedures ) .
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